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COMMENT ON "THE NYLON CURTAIN: AMERICA'S
NATIONAL BORDER AND THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS"
MICHAEL J. PERRY*

When I accepted the invitation to comment on Professor Burt
Neuborne's essay,1 I had not yet read it. Now that I have read the
essay, I am somewhat at a loss for what to say. I have rarely been
in such agreement with something I have been asked to comment
on. So, my comment cannot take the form of identifying major or
even minor points of disagreement. I shall proceed, then, less by
commenting on Professor Neuborne's wonderful essay than by relating it, very briefly, to some issues of current and deep concern to
me.
Two large inquiries engage me these days. The first is constitutional theory, concerning the nature and limits of judicial authority
in resolving constitutional issues and, more broadly, the nature
and limits of constitutional adjudication and interpretation. My
second inquiry grows out of the first, and indeed subsumes it. I call
it "Pluralism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge." This Comment provides neither the time nor the place to discuss the details
of that inquiry,2 but I do want to relate a small portion of it to
Professor Neuborne's essay.
Debate rages in contemporary intellectual circles, and beyond,
about whether there are any interests, other than biological ones,
common to all or virtually all members of the human species. Some
thinkers-sometimes called "moral relativists"-suggest that there
are none. Consider the principal implication of that position. If
there are no common human interests, then we cannot choose
among competing ways of life based on what way or ways of life
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B. 1968, Georgetown University; J.D. 1973, Columbia University.
1. Neuborne & Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and The Free
Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719 (1985).
2. For some thoughts emerging from this inquiry, see Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk
nor the "Critiqueof Rights" Too Seriously, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1405 (1984); Perry, Some Notes
(1985)
on Absolutism, Consequentialism, and Incommensurability,80 Nw. U.L. REV. (forthcoming).
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better satisfy common human needs. If there are no common
human interests, then all we can say about the Soviet system of
government, for example, is that it is unAmerican.
Are there any common interests? That is a difficult question, of
course, and obviously beyond the scope of this brief Comment. I
shall nevertheless put something on the table for conversation. Virtually every human being is committed to her own well-being. This
is not all she is committed to, but it follows that virtually every
human being is committed to, and in that sense has an interest in,
whatever is constitutive of or a prerequisite to her well-being, including that which she may not presently understand to be constitutive of or a prerequisite to her well-being. In particular, virtually
every human being has an interest in whatever personal capacities
and social and political conditions are prerequisites to her wellbeing.
I want to mention one capacity and set of conditions that seem
to me essential to virtually anyone's well-being: the capacity for
self-critical rationality and the conditions that permit its exercise.
Anyone can be mistaken as to one's particular interests. A capacity
critically to evaluate what one believes about one's interests is a
virtually necessary (but not a sufficient) condition of correcting
such mistakes. Because correcting such mistakes is, in turn, a virtually necessary (but not a sufficient) condition of achieving wellbeing, one has an interest in that capacity, which we might call
self-critical rationality. And, correspondingly, one has an interest
in social and political conditions that facilitate rather than impede
the exercise of self-critical rationality. Those two allied interests
are, I submit, common human interests. Any way of life that frustrates those interests is, on that score at least, less fit for human
beings than any way of life that satisfies those interests.
The legislative and executive practices admirably described by
Burt Neuborne clearly frustrate our common human interest in
fostering social and political conditions that facilitate rather than
impede the exercise of self-critical rationality. And what could be
clearer, than that there is simply no adequate justification for
those practices?
That brings me to the second matter I want to raise-the ques-
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tion of the proper judicial role. In my book3 and, more recently, in
an essay on constitutional interpretation, 4 I have defended an activist role for the judiciary in resolving constitutional issues concerning human rights. This is not the place to recapitulate the details of that defense. Suffice it to say that in the cases Professor
Neuborne has persuasively criticized in his essay, the judiciary,
and in particular the Supreme Court of the United States, has
failed to fulfill its role as a significant part of our national conscience. The Court has failed to tell Congress and the President
that they have been unfaithful to "that for which we stand." Sadly,
the Court has failed to do all it can to insure that government officials with authoritarian if not totalitarian inclinations do not subvert the commitment of our political-moral tradition to a way of
life that facilitates, rather than impedes, the exercise of self-critical
rationality.
I said at the beginning that I am very much in agreement with
what Professor Neuborne has said in his essay. What we are saying
essentially amounts to the same thing: Our political community-the United States of America-stands proudly, though not
unfailingly, for the ideal of self-critical rationality. It does so because it realizes that however well we may be doing, or think we
are doing, we can always do better. In too many cases, the Supreme Court has failed to play its important role in helping us
carry on with that struggle. As Americans and, more fundamentally, as human beings, we are all the poorer for that failure.
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